Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games by Syrgkanis, Vasilis et al.
Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games
Vasilis Syrgkanis
Microsoft Research
New York, NY
vasy@microsoft.com
Alekh Agarwal
Microsoft Research
New York, NY
alekha@microsoft.com
Haipeng Luo
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ
haipengl@cs.princeton.edu
Robert E. Schapire
Microsoft Research
New York, NY
schapire@microsoft.com
Abstract
We show that natural classes of regularized learning algorithms with a form of
recency bias achieve faster convergence rates to approximate efficiency and to
coarse correlated equilibria in multiplayer normal form games. When each player
in a game uses an algorithm from our class, their individual regret decays at
O(T−3/4), while the sum of utilities converges to an approximate optimum at
O(T−1)–an improvement upon the worst case O(T−1/2) rates. We show a black-
box reduction for any algorithm in the class to achieve O˜(T−1/2) rates against an
adversary, while maintaining the faster rates against algorithms in the class. Our
results extend those of Rakhlin and Shridharan [18] and Daskalakis et al. [4], who
only analyzed two-player zero-sum games for specific algorithms.
1 Introduction
What happens when players in a game interact with one another, all of them acting independently
and selfishly to maximize their own utilities? If they are smart, we intuitively expect their utilities
— both individually and as a group — to grow, perhaps even to approach the best possible. We
also expect the dynamics of their behavior to eventually reach some kind of equilibrium. Under-
standing these dynamics is central to game theory as well as its various application areas, including
economics, network routing, auction design, and evolutionary biology.
It is natural in this setting for the players to each make use of a no-regret learning algorithm for mak-
ing their decisions, an approach known as decentralized no-regret dynamics. No-regret algorithms
are a strong match for playing games because their regret bounds hold even in adversarial environ-
ments. As a benefit, these bounds ensure that each player’s utility approaches optimality. When
played against one another, it can also be shown that the sum of utilities approaches an approximate
optimum [2, 19], and the player strategies converge to an equilibrium under appropriate condi-
tions [7, 1, 9], at rates governed by the regret bounds. Well-known families of no-regret algorithms
include multiplicative-weights [14, 8], Mirror Descent [15], and Follow the Regularized/Perturbed
Leader [13]. (See [3, 21] for excellent overviews.) For all of these, the average regret vanishes at
the worst-case rate of O(1/
√
T ), which is unimprovable in fully adversarial scenarios.
However, the players in our setting are facing other similar, predictable no-regret learning algo-
rithms, a chink that hints at the possibility of improved convergence rates for such dynamics. This
was first observed and exploited by Daskalakis et al. [4]. For two-player zero-sum games, they de-
veloped a decentralized variant of Nesterov’s accelerated saddle point algorithm [16] and showed
that each player’s average regret converges at the remarkable rate ofO(1/T ). Although the resulting
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dynamics are somewhat unnatural, in later work, Rakhlin and Sridharan [18] showed surprisingly
that the same convergence rate holds for a simple variant of Mirror Descent with the seemingly
minor modification that the last utility observation is counted twice.
Although major steps forward, both these works are limited to two-player zero-sum games, the very
simplest case. As such, they do not cover many practically important settings, such as auctions or
routing games, which are decidedly not zero-sum, and which involve many independent actors.
In this paper, we vastly generalize these techniques to the practically important but far more chal-
lenging case of arbitrary multi-player normal-form games, giving natural no-regret dynamics whose
convergence rates are much faster than previously possible for this general setting.
Contributions. We show that the average welfare of the game, that is, the sum of player utilities,
converges to approximately optimal welfare at the rate O(1/T ), rather than the previously known
rate of O(1/
√
T ). Concretely, we show a natural class of regularized no-regret algorithms with re-
cency bias that achieve welfare at least (λ/(1 + µ))OPT − O(1/T ), where λ and µ are parameters
in a smoothness condition on the game introduced by Roughgarden [19]. For the same class of algo-
rithms, we show that each individual player’s average regret converges to zero at the rateO
(
T−3/4
)
.
Thus, our results entail an algorithm for computing coarse correlated equilibria in a decentralized
manner with significantly faster convergence than existing methods.
We additionally give a black-box reduction that preserves the fast rates in favorable environments,
while robustly maintaining O˜(1/
√
T ) regret against any opponent in the worst case.
Even for two-person zero-sum games, our results for general games expose a hidden generality and
modularity underlying the previous results [4, 18]. First, our analysis identifies stability and recency
bias as key structural ingredients of an algorithm with fast rates. This covers the Optimistic Mirror
Descent of Rakhlin and Sridharan [18] as an example, but also applies to optimistic variants of Fol-
low the Regularized Leader (FTRL), including dependence on arbitrary weighted windows in the
history as opposed to just the utility from the last round. Recency bias is a behavioral pattern com-
monly observed in game-theoretic environments [10]; as such, our results can be viewed as a partial
theoretical justification. Second, previous approaches in [4, 18] on achieving both faster conver-
gence against similar algorithms while at the same time O˜(1/
√
T ) regret rates against adversaries
were shown via ad-hoc modifications of specific algorithms. We give a black-box modification
which is not algorithm specific and works for all these optimistic algorithms.
Finally, we simulate a 4-bidder simultaneous auction game, and compare our optimistic algorithms
against Hedge [8] in terms of utilities, regrets and convergence to equilibria.
2 Repeated Game Model and Dynamics
Consider a static game G among a set N of n players. Each player i has a strategy space Si and a
utility function ui : S1 × . . .× Sn → [0, 1] that maps a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) to a utility
ui(s). We assume that the strategy space of each player is finite and has cardinality d, i.e. |Si| = d.
We denote with w = (w1, . . . ,wn) a profile of mixed strategies, where wi ∈ ∆(Si) and wi,x is the
probability of strategy x ∈ Si. Finally let Ui(w) = Es∼w[ui(s)], the expected utility of player i.
We consider the setting where the game G is played repeatedly for T time steps. At each time
step t each player i picks a mixed strategy wti ∈ ∆(Si). At the end of the iteration each player i
observes the expected utility he would have received had he played any possible strategy x ∈ Si.
More formally, let uti,x = Es−i∼wt−i [ui(x, s−i)], where s−i is the set of strategies of all but the i
th
player, and let uti = (u
t
i,x)x∈Si . At the end of each iteration each player i observes u
t
i. Observe that
the expected utility of a player at iteration t is simply the inner product 〈wti ,uti〉.
No-regret dynamics. We assume that the players each decide their strategy wti based on a van-
ishing regret algorithm. Formally, for each player i, the regret after T time steps is equal to the
maximum gain he could have achieved by switching to any other fixed strategy:
ri(T ) = sup
w∗i ∈∆(Si)
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉
.
2
The algorithm has vanishing regret if ri(T ) = o(T ).
Approximate Efficiency of No-Regret Dynamics. We are interested in analyzing the average
welfare of such vanishing regret sequences. For a given strategy profile s the social welfare is
defined as the sum of the player utilities: W (s) =
∑
i∈N ui(s). We overload notation to denote
W (w) = Es∼w[W (s)]. We want to lower bound how far the average welfare of the sequence is,
with respect to the optimal welfare of the static game:
OPT = max
s∈S1×...×Sn
W (s).
This is the optimal welfare achievable in the absence of player incentives and if a central coordinator
could dictate each player’s strategy. We next define a class of games first identified by Roughgar-
den [19] on which we can approximate the optimal welfare using decoupled no-regret dynamics.
Definition 1 (Smooth game [19]). A game is (λ, µ)-smooth if there exists a strategy profile s∗ such
that for any strategy profile s:
∑
i∈N ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ λOPT − µW (s).
In words, any player using his optimal strategy continues to do well irrespective of other players’
strategies. This condition directly implies near-optimality of no-regret dynamics as we show below.
Proposition 2. In a (λ, µ)-smooth game, if each player i suffers regret at most ri(T ), then:
1
T
T∑
t=1
W (wt) ≥ λ
1 + µ
OPT − 1
1 + µ
1
T
∑
i∈N
ri(T ) =
1
ρ
OPT − 1
1 + µ
1
T
∑
i∈N
ri(T ),
where the factor ρ = (1 + µ)/λ is called the price of anarchy (POA).
This proposition is essentially a more explicit version of Roughgarden’s result [19]; we provide a
proof in the appendix for completeness. The result shows that the convergence to POA is driven
by the quantity 11+µ
1
T
∑
i∈N ri(T ). There are many algorithms which achieve a regret rate of
ri(T ) = O(
√
log(d)T ), in which case the latter theorem would imply that the average welfare con-
verges to POA at a rate of O(n
√
log(d)/T ). As we will show, for some natural classes of no-regret
algorithms the average welfare converges at the much faster rate of O(n2 log(d)/T ).
3 Fast Convergence to Approximate Efficiency
In this section, we present our main theoretical results characterizing a class of no-regret dynamics
which lead to faster convergence in smooth games. We begin by describing this class.
Definition 3 (RVU property). We say that a vanishing regret algorithm satisfies the Regret bounded
by Variation in Utilities (RVU) property with parameters α > 0 and 0 < β ≤ γ and a pair of dual
norms (‖ · ‖, ‖ · ‖∗)1 if its regret on any sequence of utilities u1,u2, . . . ,uT is bounded as
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗ −wt,ut〉 ≤ α+ β T∑
t=1
‖ut − ut−1‖2∗ − γ
T∑
t=1
‖wt −wt−1‖2. (1)
Typical online learning algorithms such as Mirror Descent and FTRL do not satisfy the RVU property
in their vanilla form, as the middle term grows as
∑T
t=1 ‖ut‖2∗ for these methods. However, Rakhlin
and Sridharan [17] give a modification of Mirror Descent with this property, and we will present a
similar variant of FTRL in the sequel.
We now present two sets of results when each player uses an algorithm with this property. The
first discusses the convergence of social welfare, while the second governs the convergence of the
individual players’ utilities at a fast rate.
1The dual to a norm ‖ · ‖ is defined as ‖v‖∗ = sup‖u‖≤1 〈u, v〉.
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3.1 Fast Convergence of Social Welfare
Given Proposition 2, we only need to understand the evolution of the sum of players’ regrets∑T
t=1 ri(T ) in order to obtain convergence rates of the social welfare. Our main result in this
section bounds this sum when each player uses dynamics with the RVU property.
Theorem 4. Suppose that the algorithm of each player i satisfies the property RVU with parameters
α, β and γ such that β ≤ γ/(n− 1)2 and ‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖1. Then
∑
i∈N ri(T ) ≤ αn.
Proof. Since ui(s) ≤ 1, definitions imply: ‖uti−ut−1i ‖∗ ≤
∑
s−i
∣∣∣∏j 6=i wtj,sj −∏j 6=i wt−1j,sj ∣∣∣ . The
latter is the total variation distance of two product distributions. By known properties of total varia-
tion (see e.g. [12]), this is bounded by the sum of the total variations of each marginal distribution:∑
s−i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
j 6=i
wtj,sj −
∏
j 6=i
wt−1j,sj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
j 6=i
‖wtj −wt−1j ‖ (2)
By Jensen’s inequality,
(∑
j 6=i ‖wtj −wt−1j ‖
)2
≤ (n− 1)∑j 6=i ‖wtj −wt−1j ‖2, so that∑
i∈N
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ ≤ (n− 1)
∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
‖wtj −wt−1j ‖2 = (n− 1)2
∑
i∈N
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2.
The theorem follows by summing up the RVU property (1) for each player i and observing that the
summation of the second terms is smaller than that of the third terms and thereby can be dropped.
Remark: The rates from the theorem depend on α, which will be O(1) in the sequel. The above
theorem extends to the case where ‖ · ‖ is any norm equivalent to the `1 norm. The resulting
requirement on β in terms of γ can however be more stringent. Also, the theorem does not require
that all players use the same no-regret algorithm unlike previous results [4, 18], as long as each
player’s algorithm satisfies the RVU property with a common bound on the constants.
We now instantiate the result with examples that satisfy the RVU property with different constants.
3.1.1 Optimistic Mirror Descent
The optimistic mirror descent (OMD) algorithm of Rakhlin and Sridharan [17] is parameterized by
an adaptive predictor sequence Mti and a regularizer
2 R which is 1-strongly convex3 with respect
to a norm ‖ · ‖. Let DR denote the Bregman divergence associated with R. Then the update rule is
defined as follows: let g0i = argming∈∆(Si)R(g) and
Φ(u,g) = argmax
w∈∆(Si)
η · 〈w,u〉 −DR(w,g),
then:
wti = Φ(M
t
i,g
t−1
i ), and g
t
i = Φ(u
t
i,g
t−1
i )
Then the following proposition can be obtained for this method.
Proposition 5. The OMD algorithm using stepsize η and Mti = u
t−1
i satisfies the RVU property
with constants α = R/η, β = η, γ = 1/(8η), where R = maxi supf DR(f,g
0
i ).
The proposition follows by further crystallizing the arguments of Rakhlin and Sridaran [18], and we
provide a proof in the appendix for completeness. The above proposition, along with Theorem 4,
immediately yields the following corollary, which had been proved by Rakhlin and Sridharan [18]
for two-person zero-sum games, and which we here extend to general games.
Corollary 6. If each player runs OMD with Mti = u
t−1
i and stepsize η = 1/(
√
8(n− 1)), then we
have
∑
i∈N ri(T ) ≤ nR/η ≤ n(n− 1)
√
8R = O(1).
The corollary follows by noting that the condition β ≤ γ/(n− 1)2 is met with our choice of η.
2Here and in the sequel, we can use a different regularizer Ri for each player i, without qualitatively
affecting any of the results.
3R is 1-strongly convex ifR (u+v
2
) ≤ R(u)+R(v)
2
− ‖u−v‖2
8
, ∀u, v.
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3.1.2 Optimistic Follow the Regularized Leader
We next consider a different class of algorithms denoted as optimistic follow the regularized leader
(OFTRL). This algorithm is similar but not equivalent to OMD, and is an analogous extension of
standard FTRL [13]. This algorithm takes the same parameters as for OMD and is defined as follows:
Let w0i = argminw∈∆(Si)R(w) and:
wTi = argmax
w∈∆(Si)
〈
w,
T−1∑
t=1
uti +M
T
i
〉
− R(w)
η
.
We consider three variants of OFTRL with different choices of the sequence Mti, incorporating the
recency bias in different forms.
One-step recency bias: The simplest form of OFTRL uses Mti = u
t−1
i and obtains the following
result, where R = maxi
(
supf∈∆(Si)R(f)− inff∈∆(Si)R(f)
)
.
Proposition 7. The OFTRL algorithm using stepsize η and Mti = u
t−1
i satisfies the RVU property
with constants α = R/η, β = η and γ = 1/(4η).
Combined with Theorem 4, this yields the following constant bound on the total regret of all players:
Corollary 8. If each player runs OFTRL with Mti = u
t−1
i and η = 1/(2(n − 1)), then we have∑
i∈N ri(T ) ≤ nR/η ≤ 2n(n− 1)R = O(1).
Rakhlin and Sridharan [17] also analyze an FTRL variant, but require a self-concordant barrier for
the constraint set as opposed to an arbitrary strongly convex regularizer, and their bound is missing
the crucial negative terms of the RVU property which are essential for obtaining Theorem 4.
H-step recency bias: More generally, given a window size H , one can define Mti =∑t−1
τ=t−H u
τ
i /H . We have the following proposition.
Proposition 9. The OFTRL algorithm using stepsize η and Mti =
∑t−1
τ=t−H u
τ
i /H satisfies the
RVU property with constants α = R/η, β = ηH2 and γ = 1/(4η).
Setting η = 1/(2H(n− 1)), we obtain the analogue of Corollary 8, with an extra factor of H .
Geometrically discounted recency bias: The next proposition considers an alternative form of
recency bias which includes all the previous utilities, but with a geometric discounting.
Proposition 10. The OFTRL algorithm using stepsize η andMti =
1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τuτi satisfies
the RVU property with constants α = R/η, β = η/(1− δ)3 and γ = 1/(8η).
Note that these choices for Mti can also be used in OMD with qualitatively similar results.
3.2 Fast Convergence of Individual Utilities
The previous section shows implications of the RVU property on the social welfare. This section
complements these with a similar result for each player’s individual utility.
Theorem 11. Suppose that the players use algorithms satisfying the RVU property with parameters
α > 0, β > 0, γ ≥ 0. If we further have the stability property ‖wti − wt+1i ‖ ≤ κ, then for any
player
∑T
t=1 〈w∗i −wti ,uti〉 ≤ α+ βκ2(n− 1)2T.
Similar reasoning as in Theorem 4 yields: ‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ ≤ (n− 1)
∑
j 6=i ‖wtj −wt−1j ‖2 ≤ (n− 1)2κ2,
and summing the terms gives the theorem.
Noting that OFTRL satisfies the RVU property with constants given in Proposition 7 and stability
property with κ = 2η (see Lemma 20 in the appendix), we have the following corollary.
Corollary 12. If all players use the OFTRL algorithm withMti = u
t−1
i and η = (n−1)−1/2T−1/4,
then we have
∑T
t=1 〈w∗i −wti ,uti〉 ≤ (R+ 4)
√
n− 1 · T 1/4.
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Similar results hold for the other forms of recency bias, as well as for OMD. Corollary 12 gives a
fast convergence rate of the players’ strategies to the set of coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) of the
game. This improves the previously known convergence rate
√
T (e.g. [11]) to CCE using natural,
decoupled no-regret dynamics defined in [4].
4 Robustness to Adversarial Opponent
So far we have shown simple dynamics with rapid convergence properties in favorable environments
when each player in the game uses an algorithm with the RVU property. It is natural to wonder if
this comes at the cost of worst-case guarantees when some players do not use algorithms with this
property. Rakhlin and Sridharan [18] address this concern by modifying the OMD algorithm with
additional smoothing and adaptive step-sizes so as to preserve the fast rates in the favorable case
while still guaranteeing O(1/
√
T ) regret for each player, no matter how the opponents play. It is
not so obvious how this modification might extend to other procedures, and it seems undesirable
to abandon the black-box regret transformations we used to obtain Theorem 4. In this section, we
present a generic way of transforming an algorithm which satisfies the RVU property so that it retains
the fast convergence in favorable settings, but always guarantees a worst-case regret of O˜(1/
√
T ).
In order to present our modification, we need a parametric form of the RVU property which will
also involve a tunable parameter of the algorithm. For most online learning algorithms, this will
correspond to the step-size parameter used by the algorithm.
Definition 13 (RVU(ρ) property). We say that a parametric algorithm A(ρ) satisfies the Regret
bounded by Variation in Utilities(ρ) (RVU(ρ)) property with parameters α, β, γ > 0 and a pair of
dual norms (‖ · ‖, ‖ · ‖∗) if its regret on any sequence of utilities u1,u2, . . . ,uT is bounded as
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗ −wt,ut〉 ≤ α
ρ
+ ρβ
T∑
t=1
‖ut − ut−1‖2∗ −
γ
ρ
T∑
t=1
‖wt −wt−1‖2. (3)
In both OMD and OFTRL algorithms from Section 3, the parameter ρ is precisely the stepsize η.
We now show an adaptive choice of ρ according to an epoch-based doubling schedule.
Black-box reduction. Given a parametric algorithm A(ρ) as a black-box we construct a wrapper
A′ based on the doubling trick: The algorithm of each player proceeds in epochs. At each epoch r
the player i has an upper bound ofBr on the quantity
∑T
t=1 ‖uti−ut−1i ‖2∗. We start with a parameter
η∗ and B1 = 1, and for τ = 1, 2, . . . , T repeat:
1. Play according to A(ηr) and receive uτi .
2. If
∑τ
t=1 |uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ ≥ Br:
(a) Update r ← r + 1, Br ← 2Br, ηr = min
{
α√
Br
, η∗
}
, with α as in Equation (3).
(b) Start a new run of A with parameter ηr.
Theorem 14. Algorithm A′ achieves regret at most the minimum of the following two terms:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ log(T )(2 + α
η∗
+ (2 + η∗ · β)
T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗
)
− γ
η∗
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2; (4)
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ log(T )
1 + α
η∗
+ (1 + α · β) ·
√√√√2 T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗
 (5)
That is, the algorithm satisfies the RVU property, and also has regret that can never exceed O˜(
√
T ).
The theorem thus yields the following corollary, which illustrates the stated robustness of A′.
Corollary 15. Algorithm A′, with η∗ = γ(2+β)(n−1)2 log(T ) , achieves regret O˜(
√
T ) against any
adversarial sequence, while at the same time satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4. Thereby, if all
players use such an algorithm, then:
∑
i∈N ri(T ) ≤ n log(T )(α/η∗ + 2) = O˜(1).
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Figure 1: Maximum and sum of individual regrets over time under the Hedge (blue) and
Optimistic Hedge (red) dynamics.
Proof. Observe that for such η∗, we have that: (2 + η∗ · β) log(T ) ≤ (2 + β) log(T ) ≤ γη∗(n−1)2 .
Therefore, algorithm A′, satisfies the sufficient conditions of Theorem 4.
If A(ρ) is the OFTRL algorithm, then we know by Proposition 7 that the above result applies with
α = R = maxwR(w), β = 1, γ = 14 and ρ = η. Setting η∗ = γ(2+β)(n−1)2 = 112(n−1)2 , the
resulting algorithm A′ will have regret at most: O˜(n2√T ) against an arbitrary adversary, while if
all players use algorithm A′ then∑i∈N ri(T ) = O(n3 log(T )).
An analogue of Theorem 11 can also be established for this algorithm:
Corollary 16. If A satisfies the RVU(ρ) property, and also ‖wti − wt−1i ‖ ≤ κρ, then A′ with
η∗ = T−1/4 achieves regret O˜(T 1/4) if played against itself, and O˜(
√
T ) against any opponent.
Once again, OFTRL satisfies the above conditions with κ = 2, implying robust convergence.
5 Experimental Evaluation
We analyzed the performance of optimistic follow the regularized leader with the entropy regularizer,
which corresponds to the Hedge algorithm [8] modified so that the last iteration’s utility for each
strategy is double counted; we refer to it as Optimistic Hedge. More formally, the probability of
player i playing strategy j at iteration T is proportional to exp
(
−η ·
(∑T−2
t=1 u
t
ij + 2u
T−1
ij
))
, rather
than exp
(
−η ·∑T−1t=1 utij) as is standard for Hedge.
We studied a simple auction where n players are bidding for m items. Each player has a value v
for getting at least one item and no extra value for more items. The utility of a player is the value
for the allocation he derived minus the payment he has to make. The game is defined as follows:
simultaneously each player picks one of the m items and submits a bid on that item (we assume
bids to be discretized). For each item, the highest bidder wins and pays his bid. We let players play
this game repeatedly with each player invoking either Hedge or optimistic Hedge. This game, and
generalizations of it, are known to be (1 − 1/e, 0)-smooth [22], if we also view the auctioneer as a
player whose utility is the revenue. The welfare of the game is the value of the resulting allocation,
hence not a constant-sum game. The welfare maximization problem corresponds to the unweighted
bipartite matching problem. The POA captures how far from the optimal matching is the average
allocation of the dynamics. By smoothness we know it converges to at least 1− 1/e of the optimal.
Fast convergence of individual and average regret. We run the game for n = 4 bidders and
m = 4 items and valuation v = 20. The bids are discretized to be any integer in [1, 20]. We find
that the sum of the regrets and the maximum individual regret of each player are remarkably lower
under Optimistic Hedge as opposed to Hedge. In Figure 1 we plot the maximum individual regret
as well as the sum of the regrets under the two algorithms, using η = 0.1 for both methods. Thus
convergence to the set of coarse correlated equilibria is substantially faster under Optimistic Hedge,
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Figure 2: Expected bid and per-iteration utility of a player on one of the four items over time, under
Hedge (blue) and Optimistic Hedge (red) dynamics.
confirming our results in Section 3.2. We also observe similar behavior when each player only has
value on a randomly picked player-specific subset of items, or uses other step sizes.
More stable dynamics. We observe that the behavior under Optimistic Hedge is more stable than
under Hedge. In Figure 2, we plot the expected bid of a player on one of the items and his expected
utility under the two dynamics. Hedge exhibits the sawtooth behavior that was observed in gener-
alized first price auction run by Overture (see [5, p. 21]). In stunning contrast, Optimistic Hedge
leads to more stable expected bids over time. This stability property of optimistic Hedge is one of
the main intuitive reasons for the fast convergence of its regret.
Welfare. In this class of games, we did not observe any significant difference between the average
welfare of the methods. The key reason is the following: the proof that no-regret dynamics are
approximately efficient (Proposition 2) only relies on the fact that each player does not have regret
against the strategy s∗i used in the definition of a smooth game. In this game, regret against these
strategies is experimentally comparable under both algorithms, even though regret against the best
fixed strategy is remarkably different. This indicates a possibility for faster rates for Hedge in
terms of welfare. In Appendix H, we show fast convergence of the efficiency of Hedge for cost-
minimization games, though with a worse POA .
6 Discussion
This work extends and generalizes a growing body of work on decentralized no-regret dynamics in
many ways. We demonstrate a class of no-regret algorithms which enjoy rapid convergence when
played against each other, while being robust to adversarial opponents. This has implications in
computation of correlated equilibria, as well as understanding the behavior of agents in complex
multi-player games. There are a number of interesting questions and directions for future research
which are suggested by our results, including the following:
Convergence rates for vanilla Hedge: The fast rates of our paper do not apply to algorithms
such as Hedge without modification. Is this modification to satisfy RVU only sufficient or also
necessary? If not, are there counterexamples? In the supplement, we include a sketch hinting at such
a counterexample, but also showing fast rates to a worse equilibrium than our optimistic algorithms.
Convergence of players’ strategies: The OFTRL algorithm often produces much more stable tra-
jectories empirically, as the players converge to an equilibrium, as opposed to say Hedge. A precise
quantification of this desirable behavior would be of great interest.
Better rates with partial information: If the players do not observe the expected utility function,
but only the moves of the other players at each round, can we still obtain faster rates?
8
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Supplementary material for
“Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games”
A Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2. In a (λ, µ)-smooth game, if each player i suffers regret at most ri(T ), then:
1
T
T∑
t=1
W (wt) ≥ λ
1 + µ
OPT − 1
1 + µ
1
T
∑
i∈N
ri(T ) =
1
ρ
OPT − 1
1 + µ
1
T
∑
i∈N
ri(T ),
where the factor ρ = (1 + µ)/λ is called the price of total anarchy (POA).
Proof. Since each player i has regret ri(T ), we have that:
T∑
t=1
〈
wti ,u
t
i
〉 ≥ T∑
t=1
uti,s∗i − ri(T ) (6)
Summing over all players and using the smoothness property:
T∑
t=1
W (wt) =
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈N
〈
wti ,u
t
i
〉 ≥ T∑
t=1
∑
i∈N
uti,s∗i −
∑
i∈N
ri(T )
=
T∑
t=1
Es∼wt
[∑
i∈N
ui(s
∗
i , s−i)
]
−
∑
i∈N
ri(T )
≥
T∑
t=1
(λOPT − µEs∼wt [W (s)])−
∑
i∈N
ri(T )
=
T∑
t=1
(
λOPT − µW (wt))−∑
i∈N
ri(T )
By re-arranging we get the result.
B Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5. The OMD algorithm using stepsize η and Mti = u
t−1
i satisfies the RVU property
with constants α = R/η, β = η, γ = 1/(8η), where R = maxi supf DR(f,g
0
i ).
We will use the following theorem of [18].
Theorem 17 (Raklin and Sridharan [18]). The regret of a player under optimistic mirror descent
and with respect to any w∗i ∈ ∆(Si) is upper bounded by:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+
T∑
t=1
‖uti −Mti‖∗‖wti − gti‖ −
1
2η
T∑
t=1
(‖wti − gti‖2 + ‖wti − gt−1i ‖2)
(7)
where R = supf DR(f, g0).
We show that if the players use optimistic mirror descent with Mti = u
t−1
i , then the regret of each
player satisfies the sufficient condition presented in the previous section. Some of the key facts
(Equations (9) and (10)) that we use in the following proof appear in [18]. However, the formulation
of the regret that we present in the following theorem is not immediately clear in their proof, so we
present it here for clarity and completeness.
1
Theorem 18. The regret of a player under optimistic mirror descent with Mti = u
t−1
i and with
respect to any w∗i ∈ ∆(Si) is upper bounded by:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ −
1
8η
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2 (8)
Proof. By Theorem 17, instantiated for Mti = u
t−1
i , we get:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+
T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖∗‖wti − gti‖
− 1
2η
T∑
t=1
(‖wti − gti‖2 + ‖wti − gt−1i ‖2)
Using the fact that for any ρ > 0:
‖uti −Mti‖∗‖wti − gti‖ ≤
ρ
2
‖uti −Mti‖2∗ +
1
2ρ
‖wti − gti‖2 (9)
We get:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+
ρ
2
T∑
t=1
‖uti−ut−1i ‖2∗−
(
1
2η
− 1
2ρ
) T∑
t=1
‖wti−gti‖2−
1
2η
T∑
t=1
‖wti−gt−1i ‖2
For ρ = 2η, the latter simplifies to:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ −
1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖wti − gti‖2 −
1
2η
T∑
t=1
‖wti − gt−1i ‖2
≤ R
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ −
1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖wti − gti‖2 −
1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖wti − gt−1i ‖2
Last we use the fact that:
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2 ≤ 2‖wti − gt−1i ‖2 + 2‖wt−1i − gt−1i ‖2 (10)
Summing over all timesteps:
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2 ≤ 2
T∑
t=1
‖wti − gt−1i ‖2 + 2
T∑
t=1
‖wt−1i − gt−1i ‖2
≤ 2
T∑
t=1
‖wti − gt−1i ‖2 + 2
T∑
t=1
‖wti − gti‖2
Dividing over by 18η and applying it in the previous upper bound on the regret, we get:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ −
1
8η
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2
C Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 7. The OFTRL algorithm using stepsize η and Mti = u
t−1
i satisfies the RVU property
with constants α = R/η, β = η and γ = 1/(4η).
We first show that these algorithms achieve the same regret bounds as optimistic mirror descent.
This result does not appear in previous work in any form.
2
Even though the algorithms do not make use of a secondary sequence, we will still use in the analysis
the notation:
gTi = argmax
g∈∆(Si)
〈
g,
T∑
t=1
uti
〉
− R(g)
η
.
These secondary variables are often called be the leader sequence as they can see one step in the
future.
Theorem 19. The regret of a player under optimistic FTRL and with respect to any w∗i ∈ ∆(Si) is
upper bounded by:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+
T∑
t=1
‖uti −Mti‖∗‖wti − gti‖ −
1
2η
T∑
t=1
(‖wti − gti‖2 + ‖wti − gt−1i ‖2)
(11)
where R = supf R(f)− inff R(f).
Proof. First observe that:
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉
=
〈
gti −wti ,uti −Mti
〉
+
〈
gti −wti ,Mti
〉
+
〈
w∗i − gti ,uti
〉
(12)
Without loss of generality we will assume that inff R(f) = 0. Since 〈gti −wti ,uti −Mti〉 ≤ ‖gti −
wti‖‖uti −Mti‖∗, it suffices to show that for any w∗i ∈ ∆(Si):
T∑
t=1
(〈
gti −wti ,Mti
〉
+
〈
w∗i − gti ,uti
〉) ≤ R(w∗i )
η
− 1
2η
T∑
t=1
(‖wti − gti‖2 + ‖wti − gt−1i ‖2)
(13)
For shorthand notation let: IT = 12η
∑T
t=1
(‖wti − gti‖2 + ‖wti − gt−1i ‖2). By induction assume
that for all w∗i :
T−1∑
t=1
(〈
gti −wti ,Mti
〉− 〈gti ,uti〉) ≤ − T−1∑
t=1
〈
w∗i ,u
t
i
〉
+
R(w∗i )
η
− IT−1
= −
〈
w∗i ,
T−1∑
t=1
uti
〉
+
R(w∗i )
η
− IT−1
3
Apply the above for w∗i = g
T−1
i and add
〈
gTi −wTi ,MTi
〉− 〈gTi ,uTi 〉 on both sides:
T∑
t=1
(〈
gti −wti ,Mti
〉− 〈gti ,uti〉) ≤ −
〈
gT−1i ,
T−1∑
t=1
uti
〉
+
R(gT−1i )
η
− IT−1 +
〈
gTi −wTi ,MTi
〉− 〈gTi ,uTi 〉
≤ −
〈
wTi ,
T−1∑
t=1
uti
〉
+
R(wTi )
η
− IT−1 +
〈
gTi −wTi ,MTi
〉− 〈gTi ,uTi 〉
− 1
2η
‖wTi − gT−1i ‖2
= −
〈
wTi ,
T−1∑
t=1
uti +M
T
i
〉
+
R(wTi )
η
− IT−1 +
〈
gTi ,M
T
i
〉− 〈gTi ,uTi 〉
− 1
2η
‖wTi − gT−1i ‖2
≤ −
〈
gTi ,
T−1∑
t=1
uti +M
T
i
〉
+
R(gTi )
η
− IT−1 +
〈
gTi ,M
T
i
〉− 〈gTi ,uTi 〉
− 1
2η
‖wTi − gT−1i ‖2 −
1
2η
‖wTi − gTi ‖2
= −
〈
gTi ,
T∑
t=1
uti
〉
+
R(gTi )
η
− IT
≤ −
〈
q∗i ,
T∑
t=1
uti
〉
+
R(q∗i )
η
− IT
The inequalities follow by the optimality of the corresponding variable that was changed and by
the strong convexity of R(·). The final vector q∗i is an arbitrary vector in ∆(Si). The base case of
T = 0 follows trivially byR(f) ≥ 0 for all f . This concludes the inductive proof.
Thus optimistic FTRL achieves the exact same form of regret presented in Theorem 17 for optimistic
mirror descent. Hence, the equivalent versions of Theorem 18 and Corollary 6 hold also for the
optimistic FTRL algorithm. In fact we are able to show slightly stronger bounds for optimistic
FTRL, based on the following lemmas.
Lemma 20 (Stability). For the optimistic FTRL algorithm:
‖wti − gti‖ ≤ η · ‖Mti − uti‖∗ (14)
‖gti −wt+1i ‖ ≤ η · ‖Mt+1i ‖∗ (15)
Proof. Let FT (f) =
〈
f ,
∑T−1
t=1 u
t
i +M
T
i
〉
− η−1R(f) and GT (f) =
〈
f ,
∑T
t=1 u
t
i
〉
− η−1R(f).
Observe that: FT (f)−GT (f) =
〈
f ,MTi − uTi
〉
and FT+1(f)−GT (f) =
〈
f ,MT+1i
〉
.
Part 1 By the optimality of wTi and gTi and the strong convexity ofR(·):
FT (w
T
i ) ≥ FT (gTi ) +
1
2η
‖wTi − gTi ‖2
GT (g
T
i ) ≥ GT (wTi ) +
1
2η
‖wTi − gTi ‖2
Adding both inequalities and using the previous observations:
1
η
‖wTi − gTi ‖2 ≤
〈
wTi − gTi ,MTi − uTi
〉 ≤ ‖wTi − gTi ‖ · ‖MTi − uTi ‖∗
Dividing over by ‖wTi − gTi ‖ gives the first inequality of the lemma.
4
Part 2 By the optimality of gTi and w
T+1
i and strong convexity:
FT+1(w
T+1
i ) ≥ FT+1(gTi ) +
1
2η
‖wT+1i − gTi ‖2
GT (g
T
i ) ≥ GT (wT+1i ) +
1
2η
‖wT+1i − gTi ‖2
Adding the inequalities:
1
η
‖wT+1i − gTi ‖2 ≤
〈
wT+1i − gTi ,MT+1i
〉 ≤ ‖wT+1i − gTi ‖ · ‖MT+1i ‖∗
Dividing over by ‖wT+1i − gTi ‖, yields second inequality of the lemma.
Given Theorem 19 and Lemma 20, the proposition immediately follows since
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖uti −Mti‖2∗ −
1
2η
T∑
t=1
(‖wti − gti‖2 + ‖wti − gt−1i ‖2) .
Replacing Mti with u
t−1
i and using Inequality (10), yields the result.
D Proof of Proposition 9
Proposition 9. The OFTRL algorithm using stepsize η and Mti =
∑t−1
τ=t−H u
τ
i /H satisfies the
RVU property with constants α = R/η, β = ηH2 and γ = 1/(4η).
The proposition is equivalent to the following lemma, which we will state and prove in this appendix.
Lemma 21. For the optimistic FTRL algorithm with Mti =
1
H
∑t−1
τ=t−H u
τ
i , the regret is upper
bounded by:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+ ηH2
T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ −
1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2 (16)
whereR = supf R(f)−inff R(f). Thus we get
∑
i ri(T ) ≤ nRη = 2n(n−1)HR for η = 12H(n−1) .
Proof. Similar to Proposition 7, by Theorem 19, Lemma 20 and Inequality (10) we get:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖uti −Mti‖2∗ −
1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2
=
R
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥∥∥uti − 1H
t−1∑
τ=t−H
uτi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
∗
− 1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2
=
R
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
(
1
H
t−1∑
τ=t−H
∥∥uti − uτi ∥∥∗
)2
− 1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2
By triangle inequality:
1
H
t−1∑
τ=t−H
∥∥uti − uτi ∥∥∗ ≤ 1H
t−1∑
τ=t−H
t−1∑
q=τ
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥∗
=
t−1∑
τ=t−H
t− τ
H
∥∥uτ+1i − uτi ∥∥∗ ≤ t−1∑
τ=t−H
∥∥uτ+1i − uτi ∥∥∗
5
By Cauchy-Schwarz:(
t−1∑
τ=t−H
∥∥uτ+1i − uτi ∥∥∗
)2
≤ H
t−1∑
τ=t−H
∥∥uτ+1i − uτi ∥∥2∗
Thus we can derive that:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+ ηH
T∑
t=1
t−1∑
τ=t−H
∥∥uτ+1i − uτi ∥∥2∗ − 14η
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2
≤ R
η
+ ηH2
T∑
t=1
∥∥uti − ut−1i ∥∥2∗ − 14η
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2
E Proof of Proposition 10
Proposition 10. The OFTRL algorithm using stepsize η and Mti =
1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τuτi
satisfies the RVU property with constants α = R/η, β = η/(1− δ)3 and γ = 1/(8η).
The proposition is equivalent to the following lemma which we will prove in this appendix.
Lemma 22. For the optimistic FTRL algorithm with Mti =
1∑t
τ=0 δ
−τ
∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τuτi for some dis-
count rate δ ∈ (0, 1), the regret is upper bounded by:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+
η
(1− δ)3
T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ −
1
8η
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2 (17)
where R = supf R(f) − inff R(f). Thus we get
∑
i ri(T ) ≤ nRη = 2n(n − 1) 1(1−δ)3/2R for
η = (1−δ)
3/2
2(n−1) .
Proof. We show the theorem for the case of optimistic FTRL. The OMD case follows analogously.
Similar to Lemma 21 the regret is upper bounded by:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ R
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖uti −Mti‖2∗ −
1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2
=
R
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥∥∥uti − 1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
t−1∑
τ=0
δ−τuτi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
∗
− 1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2
We will now show that:
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥∥∥uti − 1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
t−1∑
τ=0
δ−τuτi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
∗
≤ 1
(1− δ)3
T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗
which will conclude the proof.
6
First observe by triangle inequality:
∥∥∥∥∥uti − 1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
t−1∑
τ=0
δ−τuτi
∥∥∥∥∥
∗
=
1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
t−1∑
τ=0
δ−τ‖uti − uτi ‖∗
≤ 1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
t−1∑
τ=0
δ−τ
t−1∑
q=τ
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥∗
=
1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
t−1∑
q=0
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥∗
q∑
τ=0
δ−τ
=
1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
t−1∑
q=0
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥∗ δ−q 1− δq+11− δ
≤ 1
1− δ
1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
t−1∑
q=0
δ−q
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥∗
By Cauchy-Schwarz:
(
1
1− δ
1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
t−1∑
q=0
δ−q
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥∗
)2
=
1
(1− δ)2
1(∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
)2
(
t−1∑
q=0
δ−q/2 · δ−q/2
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥∗
)2
≤ 1
(1− δ)2
1(∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
)2 t−1∑
q=0
δ−q ·
t−1∑
q=0
δ−q
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥2∗
=
1
(1− δ)2
1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
t−1∑
q=0
δ−q
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥2∗
=
1
(1− δ)2
1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
t−τ
t−1∑
q=0
δt−q
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥2∗
≤ 1
δ(1− δ)2
t−1∑
q=0
δt−q
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥2∗
Combining we get:
∥∥∥∥∥uti − 1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
t−1∑
τ=0
δ−τuτi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
∗
≤ 1
δ(1− δ)2
t−1∑
q=0
δt−q
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥2∗
7
Summing over all t and re-arranging we get:
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥∥∥uti − 1∑t−1
τ=0 δ
−τ
t−1∑
τ=0
δ−τuτi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
∗
≤ 1
δ(1− δ)2
T∑
t=1
t−1∑
q=0
δt−q
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥2∗
=
1
δ(1− δ)2
T−1∑
q=0
δ−q
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥2∗
T∑
t=q+1
δt
=
1
δ(1− δ)2
T−1∑
q=0
δ−q
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥2∗ δ(δq − δT )1− δ
=
1
(1− δ)3
T−1∑
q=0
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥2∗ (1− δT−q)
≤ 1
(1− δ)3
T−1∑
q=0
∥∥∥uq+1i − uqi∥∥∥2∗
F Proof of Theorem 14
Theorem 14. Algorithm A′ achieves regret at most the minimum of the following two terms:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ log(T )(2 + α
η∗
+ (2 + η∗ · β)
T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗
)
− γ
η∗
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2;
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ log(T )
1 + α
η∗
+ (1 + α · β) ·
√√√√2 T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗

Proof. We break the proof in the two corresponding parts.
First part. Consider a round r and let Tr be its final iteration. Also let Ir =
∑Tr
t=1 ‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗.
First observe that by the definition of Br:
1
2
Ir ≤ Br ≤ 2 · Ir + 1 (18)
By the definition of η, we know that
1
η∗
≤ 1
η
<
1
η∗
+
√
Br
α
. (19)
By the regret guarantee of algorithm A(ηr), we have that:
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ α
η
+ η · β
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ −
γ
η
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2
≤ α
η∗
+
√
Br + η∗ · β
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ −
γ
η∗
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2
≤ α
η∗
+
√
Br + η∗ · β
T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ −
γ
η∗
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2
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Since
√
Br ≤ Br + 1 ≤ 2 · Ir + 2:
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ α
η∗
+ 2 + (2 + η∗ · β)
T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ −
γ
η∗
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2
Since at each round we are doubling the bound Br and since
∑T
t=1 ‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ ≤ T , there are at
most log(T ) rounds. Summing up the above inequality for each of the at most log(T ) rounds, yields
the claimed bound in Equation (4).
Second part. Again consider any round r. By Equations (18), (19), the fact that η ≤ α√
Br
≤ α
√
2√
Ir
and by the regret of algorithm A(ηr):
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ α
η∗
+
√
Br + η · β
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗
≤ α
η∗
+
√
Br + η · β · Ir
≤ α
η∗
+
√
Br + α · β ·
√
2Ir
≤ α
η∗
+
√
2Ir + 1 + α · β ·
√
2Ir
≤ α
η∗
+ 1 +
√
2Ir + α · β ·
√
2Ir
≤ α
η∗
+ 1 + (1 + α · β)
√√√√2 T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗
Again since the number of rounds is at most log(T ), by summing up the above bound for each round
r, we get the second part of the theorem.
G Proof of Corollary 16
Corollary 16. If A satisfies the RVU(ρ) property, and also ‖wti − wt−1i ‖ ≤ κρ, then A′ with
η∗ = T−1/4 achieves regret O˜(T 1/4) if played against itself, and O˜(
√
T ) against any opponent.
Proof. Observe that at any round of A′, algorithm A is run with ηr ≤ η∗. Thus by the property of
algorithm A, we have that at every iteration: ‖wti − wt−1i ‖ ≤ κη∗ = κT−1/4. If all players use
algorithm A′, then by similar reasoning as in Theorem 4 we know that:
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗ ≤ (n− 1)
∑
j 6=i
‖wtj −wt−1j ‖2 ≤ (n− 1)2γ2η2∗ = (n− 1)2κ2T−1/2
Hence, by Equation 5, the regret of each player is bounded by:
T∑
t=1
〈
w∗i −wti ,uti
〉 ≤ log(T )
 α
η∗
+ (1 + α · β) ·
√√√√ T∑
t=1
‖uti − ut−1i ‖2∗

≤ log(T )
(
αT 1/4 + (1 + α · β) ·
√
T · (n− 1)2κ2T−1/2
)
= log(T )
(
αT 1/4 + (1 + α · β) · (n− 1)κT 1/4
)
= O˜(T 1/4)
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H Fast convergence via a first order regret bound for cost-minimization
In this section, we show how a different regret bound can also lead to a fast convergence rate for
a smooth game. For some technical reasons we consider cost instead of utility throughout this
section. We use ci : S1 × . . . × Sn → [0, 1] to denote the cost function, and similarly to previous
sections C(s) =
∑
i∈N ci(s), C(w) = Es∼w[C(s)],OPT
′ = mins∈S1×...×Sn C(s). A game is
(λ, µ)-smooth if there exists a strategy profile s∗, such that for any strategy profile s:∑
i∈N
ci(s
∗
i , s−i) ≤ λOPT′ + µC(s). (20)
Now suppose each player i uses a no-regret algorithm to produce wti on each round and receives
cost cti,s = Es−i∼wt−i [ci(s, s−i)] for each strategy s ∈ Si. Moreover, for any fixed strategy s, the
no-regret algorithm ensures
T∑
t=1
〈
wti , c
t
i
〉− T∑
t=1
cti,s ≤ A1
√√√√log d( T∑
t=1
cti,s
)
+A2 log d (21)
for some absolute constants A1 and A2. Note that this form of first order bound can be achieved by
a variety of algorithms such as Hedge with appropriate learning rate tuning. Under this setup, we
prove the following:
Theorem 23. If a game is (λ, µ)-smooth and each player uses a no-regret algorithm with a regret
satisfying Eq. (21), then we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
C(wt) ≤ λ(1 + µ)
µ(1− µ) OPT
′ +
An log d
T
where A = A
2
1µ
(1−µ)2 +
2A2
1−µ .
Proof. Using the regret bound and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
T∑
t=1
C(wt) =
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈N
〈
wti , c
t
i
〉
≤
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈N
cti,s∗i +A1
√
log d
∑
i∈N
√√√√ T∑
t=1
cti,s∗i
+A2n log d
≤
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈N
cti,s∗i +A1
√
n log d
√√√√ T∑
T=1
∑
i∈N
cti,s∗i
+A2n log d. (22)
By the smoothness assumption, we have∑
i∈N
cti,s∗i = Es∼wt
[∑
i∈N
ci(s
∗
i , s−i)
]
≤ λOPT′ + µEs∼wt [C(s)] = λOPT′ + µC(wt),
and therefore
∑T
t=1
∑
i∈N c
t
i,s∗i
≤ x2 where we define x =
√
λTOPT′ + µ
∑T
t=1 C(w
t). Now
applying this bound in Eq. (22), we continue with
1
µ
(
x2 − λTOPT′) ≤ x2 + (A1√n log d)x+A2n log d.
Rearranging gives a quadratic inequality ax2 + bx+ c ≤ 0 with
a =
1− µ
µ
, b = −A1
√
n ln d, c = −λ
µ
TOPT′ −A2n log d,
and solving for x gives
x ≤ µ
2(1− µ) (−b+
√
b2 − 4ac) ≤ µ
1− µ
√
b2 − 2ac.
Finally solving for
∑T
t=1 C(w
t) (hidden in the definition of x) gives the bound stated in the theorem.
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Note that the price of total anarchy is larger than the one achieved by previous analysis by a mul-
tiplicative factor of 1 + 1µ , but the convergence rate is much faster (n times faster compared to
optimistic mirror descent or optimistic FTRL).
I Extension to continuous strategy space games
In this section we extend our results to continuous strategy space games such as for instance ”split-
table selfish routing games” (see e.g. [20]). These are games where the price of anarchy has been
well studied and quite well motivated from internet routing. In these games we consider the dynam-
ics where the players simply observe the past play of their opponents and not the expected past play.
We consider dynamics where players don’t use mixed strategies, but are simply doing online convex
optimization algorithms on their continuous strategy spaces. Such learning on continuous games
has also been studied in more restrictive settings in [6].
In this setting we will consider the following setting: each player i has a strategy space Si which is
a closed convex set in Rd. In this setting we will denote with wi ∈ Si a strategy of a player4. Given
a profile of strategies w = (w1, . . . ,wn), each player incurs a cost ci(w) (equivalently a utility
function ui(w).
We make the following two assumptions on the costs:
1. (Convex in player strategy) For each player i and for each profile of opponent strategies
w−i, the function ci(·,w−i) is convex in wi.
2. (Lipschitz gradient) For each player i, the function δi(w) = ∇ici(w),5 is L-Lipschitz
continuous with respect to the ‖ · ‖1 norm and if w−i ∈ R(n−1)d is viewed as a vector in
the (n− 1) · d dimensional space, i.e.:
‖δi(w)− δi(y)‖∗ ≤ L ·
∑
j
‖wj − yj‖ (23)
Observe that a sufficient condition for Property (2) is that the function δi(w) is coordinate-wise
L-lipschitz with respect to the ‖ · ‖ norm.
Lemma 24. If for any j:
‖δi(w)− δi(yj ,w−j)‖∗ ≤ L‖wj − yj‖ (24)
then δi(·) satisfies Property (2).
Proof. For any two vectors w and y, think of switching from the one to the other by switching
sequentially each player from his strategy wi to yi, keeping the remaining players fixed and in
some pre-fixed player order. The difference ‖δi(w) − δi(y)‖∗ is upper bounded by the sum of
the differences of these sequential switches. The difference of each such unilateral switch for each
player j is turn upper bounded by ‖wj − yj‖, by the property assumed in the Lemma. The lemma
then follows.
Example. (Connection to discrete game). We can view the discrete action games as a special
case of the latter setting, by re-naming mixed strategies in the discrete game to pure strategies in
the continuous space game. Under this mapping, the continuous strategy space is the simplex in
Rd, where d is the number of pure strategies of the discrete game. Moreover the costs ci(w) (equiv.
utilities) are multi-linear, i.e. ci(w) =
∑
s Ci(s)
∏
j wj,s. Obviously, these multi-linear costs satisfy
assumption 1, i.e. they are convex (in fact linear) in a players strategy.
The second assumption is also satisfied, albeit with a slightly more involved proof, which appears
in the proof of Theorem 4. Basically, observe that
δi,si(w) =
∑
s−i
Ci(si, s−i)
∏
j 6=i
wj,sj (25)
4We will use wi instead of si for a pure strategy, since pure strategies of the continuous game will be sort
of treated equivalently to mixed strategies in the discrete game we described in Section 2
5With ∇ici(w) we denote the gradient of the function with respect the strategy of player i and fixing the
strategy of other players. Equivalently for each fixed w−i it is the gradient of the function ci(·,w−i).
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Assuming Ci(s) ≤ 1:
|δi,si(w)− δi,si(y)| ≤
∑
s−i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
j 6=i
wj,sj −
∏
j 6=i
yj,sj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
j 6=i
‖wj − yj‖1 (26)
Where the last inequality holds by the properties of total variation distance.
Example. (Splittable congestion games). In this game each player i has an amount of flow fi ≤ B
he wants to route from a source si to a sink ti in an undirected graphG = (V,E). Each edge e ∈ E is
associated with a latency function `e(fe) which maps an amount of flow fe passing through the edge
to a latency. We will assume that latency functions are convex, increasing and twice differentiable.
We will also assume that both `e(·) and `′e(·) are K-lipschitz functions of the flow. We will denote
with Pi the set of (si, ti) paths in the graph. Then the set of feasible strategies for each player is
all possible ways of splitting his flow fi onto these pats Pi. Denote with wp the amount of flow a
player routes on path p ∈ Pi, then the strategy space is:
Si =
wi ∈ R|Pi|+ : ∑
p∈Pi
wi,p = fp
 (27)
The latter is obviously a closed convex set in R|Pi|.
For an edge e, let fi,e(wi) =
∑
p∈Pi:e∈p wi,p to be the flow on edge e caused by player i and with
fe(w) =
∑
i fi,e(wi) to be the total flow on the edge e. Then the cost of a player is:
ci(w) =
∑
e
fi,e(wi) · `(fe(w)) (28)
First observe that the functions ci(·) are convex with respect to a player’s strategy wi. This follows
since the cost is linear across edges, thus we need to show convexity locally at each edge. The latency
function on an edge is a convex function of the total flow, hence also x`e(x + b) is also a convex
function of x. Now observe that the cost from each edge is of the form fi,e(wi)`e(fi,e(wi) + b)
which is convex with respect to fi,e(wi). In turn, fi,e(·) is a linear function of wi. Thus whole cost
function is convex in wi.
Last we need to show that the second condition on the cost functions is satisfied for some lipschitz-
ness factor L. This will be a consequence of the K-lipschitzness of the latency functions. Denote
with `ie(w) = `e(fe(w)) + fi,e(wi) · `′e(fe(w)). Then, observe that:
δi,p(w) =
∑
e∈p
(`e(fe(w)) + fi,e(wi) · `′e(fe(w))) =
∑
e∈p
`ie(w) (29)
Since both `e(·) and `′e(·) are K-lipschitz and fi,e(wi) ≤ B, we have that:
|δi,p(w)− δi,p(y)| ≤
∑
e∈p
|`ie(w)− `ie(y)|
≤
∑
e∈p
|`e(fe(w))− `e(fe(y))|+B
∑
e∈p
|`′e(fe(w))− `′e(fe(y))|
≤ K(1 +B)
∑
e∈p
|fe(w)− fe(y)| ≤ K(1 +B)
∑
e∈p
∑
j∈[n]
|fj,e(wj)− fj,e(yj)|
≤ K(1 +B)
∑
e∈p
∑
j∈[n]
∑
q∈Pj :e∈q
|wj,q − yj,q|
= K(1 +B)
∑
j∈[n]
∑
q∈Pj
∑
e∈p∩q
|wj,q − yj,q| ≤ K(1 +B)m
∑
j∈[n]
∑
q∈Pj
|wj,q − yj,q|
≤ K(1 +B)m
∑
j∈[n]
‖wj − yj‖1
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Thus we get that the second condition is satisfied with L = 2Km.
For these games we will assume that the players are performing some form of regularized learning
using the gradients of their utilities as proxies. For fast convergence we would require that the
algorithms they use satisfy the following property, which is a generalization of Theorem 4.
Theorem 25. Consider a repeated continuous strategy space game where the cost functions satisfy
properties 1, 2. Suppose that the algorithm of each player i satisfies the property that for any w∗i ∈
Si
T∑
t=1
ci(w
t)− ci(w∗i ,wt−i) ≤ α+ β
T∑
t=1
‖δi(wt)− δi(wt−1)‖2∗ − γ
T∑
t=1
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2 (30)
for some α > 0 and 0 < β ≤ γL2·n2 and with ‖ · ‖ we denote the ‖ · ‖1 norm. Then:∑
i∈N
ri(T ) ≤ n · α = O(1) (31)
Proof. By property 2, we have that:
T∑
t=1
‖δi(wt)− δi(wt−1)‖2∗ ≤ L2
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈[n]
‖wtj −wt−1j ‖
2 ≤ L2n T∑
t=1
∑
j∈[n]
‖wtj −wt−1j ‖2
By summing up the regret inequality for each player and using the above bound we get:∑
i∈N
ri(T ) ≤ n · α+ βL2n2
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈[n]
‖wtj −wt−1j ‖2 − γ
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈[n]
‖wti −wt−1i ‖2 (32)
If βL2n2 ≤ γ, the theorem follows.
All the algorithms that we described in the previous sections can be adapted to satisfy the bound
required by Theorem 25, by simply using the gradient of the cost as a proxy of the cost instead
of the actual cost. This follows by standard arguments. Hence if players follow for instance the
following adaptation of the regularized leader algorithm:
wTi = argmax
w∈Si
〈
w,
T−1∑
t=1
δi(w
t) + δi(w
T−1)
〉
− R(w)
η
(33)
then by Proposition 7 we get that their regret satisfies the conditions of Theorem 25 for a = Rη ,
β = η and γ = 14η , where R = argmaxwi∈Si R(wi). We need that ηL
2n2 ≤ 14η or equivalently
η ≤ 12Ln . Thus for η = 12Ln , if all players are using the latter algorithm we get regret of at most
n · Rη = 2Ln2R
Example. (Splittable congestion games). Consider the case of congestion games with splittable
flow, where all the latencies and their derivatives are K-Lipschitz and the flow of each player is
at most B. In that setting, suppose that we use the entropic regularizer. Then for each player i,
R ≤ B · log(|Pi|). The number of possible (s, t) paths is at most 2m, which yields R ≤ B · m.
Hence, by using the linearized follow the regularized leader, we get that the total regret is at most
2Ln2R ≤ 2K(B + 1)Bm2n2.
J Ω(
√
T ) Lower Bounds on Regret for other Dynamics
We consider a two-player zero-sum game which can be described by a utility matrix A. Assume the
row player uses MWU with a fixed learning rate η, and the column player plays the best response,
that is, a pure strategy that minimizes the row player’s expected utility for the current round. Then
the following theorem states that no matter how η is set, there is always a game A such that the
regret of the row player is at least Ω(
√
T ).
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Theorem 26. In the setting described above, let r(T ) and r′(T ) be the regret of the row player for
the game A =
(
1 0
0 1
)
and A′ =
(
1
0
)
respectively after T rounds. Then max{r(T ), r′(T )} ≥
Ω(
√
T ).
Proof. For game A, according to the setup, one can verify that the row player will play a uniform
distribution and receive utility 12 on round twhere t is odd, and for the next round t+1, the row player
will put slightly more weights on one row and the column player will pick the column that has 0
utility for that row. Specifically, the expected utility of the row player is e
η(t−1)/2
eη(t−1)/2+eη(t+1)/2 =
1
1+eη .
Therefore, the regret is (assuming T is even for simplicity)
r(T ) =
T
2
− T
2
(
1
2
+
1
1 + eη
)
=
T
2
· e
η − 1
eη + 1
.
For game A′, the expected utility of the row player on round t is e
η(t−1)
eη(t−1)+1 , and thus the regret is
r′(T ) = T −
T∑
t=1
eη(t−1)
eη(t−1) + 1
=
T∑
t=1
1
eη(t−1) + 1
≥
T∑
t=1
1
2eη(t−1)
=
1− e−Tη
2(1− e−η) .
Now if η ≥ 1, then r(T ) ≥ T2 · e−1e+1 = Ω(T ). If η ≤ 1T , then r′(T ) ≥ 1−e
−1
2(1−e− 1T )
≥ T (1−e−1)2 =
Ω(T ). Finally when 1T ≤ η ≤ 1, we have
r(T )+r′(T ) ≥ T
2
· e
η − 1
e+ 1
+
1− e−1
2(1− e−η) ≥
T
2
· e
η − 1
e+ 1
+
1− e−1
2(eη − 1) ≥
√
T · 1− e
−1
e+ 1
= Ω(
√
T ).
To sum up, we have max{r(T ), r′(T )} ≥ Ω(√T ).
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